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Abstract: In January 2012, amendments to California’s corporate code permitted a
new type of corporate form designed around for-profit entities also wishing to
commit to serving a broader “social purpose” (or purposes). Although not the first
state to embrace such reforms, California’s experiment is unique, in that it allowed
companies to opt for one of two different social benefit entity forms: the “Benefit
Corporation” (BC) and the “Flexible Purpose Corporation” (FPC). This essay
summarizes the reforms and presents basic descriptive data about the rate at which
business organizations have embraced them. Thus far, both forms have had
relatively modest take-up rates; those social enterprises that have opted for one of the
two forms have generally favored the BC over the FPC, though its market share
narrowed consistently during 2012. Although it is premature to conclude whether
social enterprise statutes will prove successful, I argue that now is an ideal time to put
the infrastructure into place for collecting, organizing and analyzing data in this arena
as it becomes available.

Author Contact: etalley@law.berkeley.edu. Thanks to Preston DuFauchard, Susan Mac Cormac,
Dana Brakman Reiser, and Jonathan Storpor for helpful comments, Jesse Finfrock, Benjamin Fox and
Samantha Strimling provided superb research assistance. All errors are mine.
*

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144567

There is one and only one social
responsibility of business – to use its
resources and engage in activities
designed to increase its profits so long
as it stays within the rules of the game,
which is to say, engages in open and
free competition without deception or
fraud.

The purpose of the corporation must be
redefined as creating shared value, not just
profit per se. This will drive the next wave of
innovation and productivity growth in the
global economy. It will also reshape
capitalism and its relationship to society.
Perhaps most important of all, learning how
to create shared value is our best chance to
legitimize business again.

Milton Friedman
Capitalism and Freedom (1962).

Michael Porter & Mark Kramer
Harv. Bus. Rev. (2011).

modern corporate capital structures – rife
with options, convertible debt, derivatives,
leverage, and thin equity cushions –
shareholders can hardly claim distinction as
the corporation’s sole “residual claimants”
(and thus the focal beneficiaries of a its
activities). Finally, skeptics assert, even if
one assumed that maximizing shareholder
welfare should take precedence over other
intra- and extra-corporate goals, that
objective does not necessarily equate to
maximizing shareholder wealth, particularly
for shareholders who have preferences
broader than wealth maximization (e.g.,
they care about for public goods,
environmental
sustainability,
wealth
distribution, and so forth). Our continued
obsession with shareholder primacy, critics
conclude, makes little economic, political,
or philosophical sense.
Defenders have rejoined that the
shareholder primacy norm does (or at least
can) make policy sense, at least for the vast
majority
of
corporations
where
shareholders still bear the lion’s share of
economic risk. Moreover, they assert, even
if shareholder primacy does not entirely
square with the way risks are actually
distributed within (and outside of) the firm,
shareholder welfare provides a useful

F

ew
propositions
of
modern
corporate law have proven as
persistent – or as debatable – as
shareholder primacy: the maxim that corporate
entities (and managers who control them)
should focus telescopically on the goal of
maximizing the wealth of shareholders
(a.k.a.,
the
corporation’s
“residual
claimants”). This core tenet (as well as
variations and violations of it) occupies a
prominent position in myriad modern
debates concerning (inter alia) corporate
governance, fiduciary duties, takeover
defenses, mergers and acquisitions, proxy
contests, securities regulation, and even
criminal law.
Skeptics of shareholder primacy –
particularly those concerned with the
broader role of sustainable business
practices – have openly questioned the
wisdom of the judicial commitment to the
shareholder welfare end, arguing that it
unjustifiably subordinates considerations
both of (extra-corporate) societal actors
and of (intra-corporate) stakeholder actors
to those of shareholders, whose capital
stake represents a narrow tranche of the
economic interests that incorporated
entities produce. Moreover, they argue, in
2
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Recently, however, a different, more
tailored governance innovation has taken
hold in a handful of states: the creation of
alternative corporate forms that require the
incorporated entity to articulate a broader
social goal (or goals) against which –
alongside
profitability
–
corporate
performance is to be gauged. These
alternative forms are designed to provide a
concrete means by which a corporation can
bind itself to a broader set of purposes,
without also having to go “all in” with nonprofit (or low-profit) status. To date, a
dozen states have implemented legislation
creating these new corporate forms (See
Table 1 below1), and many others are in
various stages of promulgation. A national
experiment is decidedly underway.
What we still lack, however, is reliable
information about the experiment’s results.
This paper attempts to make a modest
contribution to that enterprise, offering a
status report on statutory innovations
across states, and drilling down to focus on
the data currently available from
California’s
own
social
enterprise
experiment, eight months after its effective
date.
Why California? After all, its statutory
reforms are relatively new, coming almost
two years after Maryland became (in early
2010) the first state to embrace for-profit
social purpose entities.
California’s
experience is still relatively developmental
compared to other states with a longer
track record. That said, the scope of
California’s reform is notable and worthy
of our considered attention for at least two
reasons.
First, California is big,
geographically
and
economically,
comfortably ranking first in the country in
number of registered firms (incorporated
or not), employees, and payroll.2 Adding in
the home-state incorporation bias of non-

criterion for holding managers accountable
– a task that would become hopelessly
elusive were managers given wide
discretion to pick and choose which
constituency (or combination thereof) their
actions or inactions are meant to serve.
Finally, defenders argue, if broader social
purposes were important to shareholders
(or other corporate constituencies), a profit
maximizing firm would have a natural
profit incentive to commit contractually to
pursuing such purposes as a way to make
the corporation more attractive as a
supplier, trading partner or target for
capital investment.
By all indications, this now-century-old
debate will continue to rage on for some
time, and I do not aspire to resolve it here.
A fair reading of the current state of play,
however, suggests that while the
shareholder primacy norm continues to be
a valuable organizing theme for some (or
even most) corporate entities, it is not
categorically so: Numerous businesses –
particularly those in environmental
sustainability industries – would plausibly
benefit (in a variety of ways) from choosing
an entity form that commits them to
broader social purposes alongside profit
generation. Accordingly, perhaps, reformminded lawyers have endeavored over time
to conjure up mechanisms by which firms
might plausibly embrace such goals in a
credible and durable fashion.
These
reforms include initiatives to encourage
corporate social responsibility, innovations
to judicial doctrine (such as a highly
protective business judgment rule), and – in
a number of states – corporate
“constituency statutes” (which provide
legal protection for corporate directors
who wish to weigh stakeholder
considerations
alongside
shareholder
return).
3
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shareholders, corporate stakeholders and
society).7 While incorporating in another
state (e.g., one allowing tailored corporate
purposes or offering a constituency statute)
may be an option, it is not always an
attractive one for California-based firms,
who remain beholden to many of the
California’s corporate provisions anyway,
by “virtue” (using that term advisedly) of
its infamous long-arm statute.8 Similarly,
embracing other socially-oriented business
forms, such as non-profit status, or L3Cs,
posed myriad issues related to the explicit
subordination (or elimination) of profit
motive, tax considerations, and the
difficulty of attracting third-party capital
investments.
Consequently, prior to the new statutory
innovations, many (if not most) sociallyminded California businesses tended to
incorporate as “plain vanilla” Ccorporations, falling back (perhaps
optimistically)
on
their
managerial
discretion and the (so-called) business
judgment rule (“BJR”) – a legal
presumption that grants great deference to
fiduciaries in weighing the costs and
benefits of business decisions, without fear
of judicial second guessing. While the
deference embodied in the BJR is
comforting, it is also limited in a major
respect: While the rule grants fiduciaries
discretion about how to serve their
shareholder interests, it does not give
discretion about whether to do so.
Consequently, for decisions that obviously
sacrifice shareholder welfare for the benefit
of other considerations (including social
purposes), the BJR provides no protection.
Such clear tradeoffs are often manifest at
“watershed” junctures in the life of a
corporation, such as when a corporate
entity enters “Revlon” mode, putting itself
up for sale or reorganization in a fashion

public companies (one that is particularly
salient in California3), the Golden State’s
reform decisions simply matter more. And
second,
California’s
reforms
are
tantalizingly unique, in that they provide
(unlike other states) a menu of social
enterprise forms, allowing the choice
among two new alternative business forms
for social-purpose oriented corporations.
California corporations now have an option
between incorporating as a “benefit
corporation” (BC) a “flexible purpose
corporation” (FPC), 4 or any of the
preexisting forms. The intervening months
have provided an intriguing window for
assessing not only the extent of demand for
such new business forms writ large, but
revealed preferences among them.

The Backstory
Before delving into these statutes and
their effects, however, one must first
understand why proponents of reform
thought them necessary in the first
instance.
Prior to the enactment of
California’s recent legislation, if a for-profit
business located in California wished to
pursue a social benefit mission alongside
maximizing shareholder returns, it faced
limited options. Although many states’
statutes permit corporate entities great
freedom to tailor their corporate purpose
(as articulated in the charter), including
social benefit goals,5 an odd quirk in
California corporate law does not permit
that type of drafting flexibility.6 Nor, for
that matter, has California heretofore
embraced the notion of “constituency”
statues that have the effect of permitting /
requiring directors to weigh costs and
benefits of their decisions across a large
number of constituencies (including
4

enterprise corporate forms was somewhat
more surprising. Although a working
group focused on stimulating social
entrepreneurship in California originally
began drafting unified legislation, the group
eventually split into two camps. This divide
persisted, ultimately leading to two bills
that – while substantially similar in many
respects – differed in some important ways.

that will cause (usually public) shareholders
to surrender their ability to extract a
control premium for their shares.9 Here,
the dictates of corporate law tend to give
corporate fiduciaries little choice but to
take appropriate steps to maximize
shareholders' short term value and accept
the highest offer reasonably available. Many
other concerns (including social benefit
goals) tend to fade quickly when
scrutinized against this simple judicial
calculus.
Finally, even assuming away all the
above
constraints,
many
reform
proponents perceived existing corporate
structures as inadequate means for making
credible, long-term commitments to a
social purpose that remains immune to
“mission creep.” In other words, if market
conditions became too tempting or the
demands of short-termism to pressing, they
argued, the corporation could too easily redefine its mission through charter / bylaw
amendments, restructurings, dissolutions,
asset sales or acquisitions, abandoning any
purpose that did not contribute directly to
attractive quarterly P&Ls.
Legal reform advocates therefore
perceived this status quo ante to be
inadequate for the needs of at least some
socially-motivated entrepreneurs, their
employees, and their prospective investors,
who wished to pursue profitable ventures
without having to sacrifice their company’s
defining commitment to a broader social
goals, such as environmental sustainability,
public health, and poverty elimination.
Drawing momentum from the preexisting
efforts at reform in other states, the
California BC and FPC statutes were soon
to follow.
Although some reform in California
seemed inevitable, the state’s ultimate
decision to embrace of two distinct social

The California Reforms
As noted above, both the BC and FPC
statutes in California require the
corporation to articulate in its charter a
public purpose (or purposes), and to issue
annual reports on the corporation’s fealty
to that articulated purpose. Moreover,
both statutes require a super-majority vote
of shareholders (set by default at 2/3) to
alter, repeal, reorganize out of, or otherwise
jettison the special purpose provision.
Nevertheless, the two forms differ in a few
important respects.
First, FPCs give
somewhat of a greater freedom to tailor
and articulate special purposes in the
charter, while the BC purpose is somewhat
more structured around a broad social
purpose, defined as “a material positive
impact on society and the environment,
taken as a whole…”10 In addition, the
statutes differ in the process by which
fidelity to the broader social purpose is
measured and assessed. While both require
annual reports, assessment within a BC
must be in accordance with an established,
documented and measurable third-party
standard; the FPC form, in contrast,
permits greater latitude in analyzing
performance. Third, embedded in the BC
statute is also a form of traditional
constituency statue, requiring the directors
to consider the impacts of any action or
proposed action upon various stakeholders
5

“mission creep.” A disadvantage that both
forms face is their novelty, and the lack of a
well settled jurisprudence clarifying the
interpretation and application of the
legislative reforms, as well as the
development of best practices in the
operation and management of both firms.
In this respect, it seems plausible that the
BC form – by virtue of its relatively more
established presence other states – is likely
to generate a more robust quantity of
judicial opinions in the short to medium
term.14
Only time will tell, of course,
which of these relative costs and benefits
will win the day (and for what type of firm).

of the corporation, such as customers and
employees.11 The FPC statute does not
contain a like provision. Furthermore, the
BC statute creates a new type of “Benefit
Enforcement Proceeding” (filed by a
director, shareholder, or significant equity
holder) while the FPC statute relies on
traditional enforcement rights (and in
particular
the
derivative
action).
Moreover, many of the core attributes
typifying the California BC structure also
carry over to other states’ benefit
corporation statutes (albeit with some
exceptions12) – a similarity generated by the
national
scope
of
reform-minded
companies like B-Lab.
By most accounts, the FPC entails a
somewhat greater degree of (for want of a
better term) flexibility on organizational /
governance dimensions than does the BC
form, and it therefore represents the more
modest departure from the traditional
corporate form. Such flexibility likely
brings about both benefits and costs. As to
the former, FPCs are more likely to have a
‘look and feel’ similar to other for-profit
start-ups, an affinity that may (in some
circumstances) attract more financing
interest from sources who value legal
predictability and familiarity with existing
corporate legal standards.13 On the other
hand, by committing to independent thirdparty accountability standards and creating
a new enforcement action, the BC form
makes an arguably more concrete
commitment that may (in some
circumstances) be less susceptible to

Current State of Affairs
Interesting as all the above speculations
might be, they will remain speculations
until we have meaningful data on how
prospective new businesses have responded
to legal reforms. We are now only at the
cusp of being able to collect, organize and
analyze this information. That said, data
provided by the State of California permit
some preliminary windows into the current
state of play.15 What follows is a short
overview of those data. I remind readers
that the social entrepreneurship experiment
is likely to be in a state of change and flux
for some time, and accordingly the trends
identified below are almost certain to
change as practitioners, judges, and
business perspectives evolve.

6

to-one basis over the
FPC.
The reasons
behind this preference
are as yet unclear, as is
the question of whether
this preference will
persist
over
time.
Figure
2
perhaps
provides
a
small
window
into
this
question,
tracking
incorporations on a
monthly basis.
The
figure suggests that the
strong preference for
the BC over the FPC
was particularly marked
during the first few
months in which the statutes were
effective,
possibly
suggesting
an
“inventorying” phenomenon, in which
prospective BCs were already organized
and lined up for incorporation before the
statute’s effective date.16 In later months,
while the BC still appears to be keeping a

Figure 1 provides a count of BC and
FPC incorporations filed in California
between January 1 and mid-August, 2012.
As illustrated by the figure, a total of 75
corporate entities were organized under
one of the two new statutes. Although
large enough a group to be analyzed
statistically, this is
still an extremely
small number in the
greater scheme of
things,
massively
dwarfed by the
roughly 60,000 new
incorporations
occurred
overall
during the same
period of time in
California.
As Figure 1
further
shows,
entities that chose to
file under one of the
two new statutory
forms preferred the
BC form on a four7

to
the
large
concentration
of
renewable
/
alternative energy
and
clean-tech
companies located
in the Bay Area.
Given the nature
of social enterprise
oriented businesses,
and
their
concentration
in
emerging industries,
one would expect
that FPC and BC
incorporations
would be heavily
represented by new
companies
rather
than existing ones. Consistent with this
prediction, Figure 4 shows that over threequarters of the BC/FPC incorporations in
California during 2012 represent what
appear to be new corporations rather than
corporations that either amended their

narrow advantage, the FPC has largely
increased in popularity while the BC has
remained somewhat stable.
Geographic dispersion within (and
outside of) California is also provides an
interesting insight into demand for
alternative forms. Figure 3 separates the
new business entities
by the geographic
location
of
their
headquarters. As the
figure demonstrates,
the vast majority of
incorporations
(95
percent)
involve
companies
whose
business
is
headquartered
in
California. Of those,
Northern California
companies outnumber
Southern California by
almost a two-to-one
ratio.
This greater
popularity in Northern
California may be due
8

between. Although
the numbers are
admittedly small, it
is interesting to note
that at least some
well
established
firms
find
it
worthwhile to adopt
the BC/FPC status.
An
interesting
and unanticipated
oddity about the
firms who adopted
FPC/BC status by
converting
or
amending
their
charters is their
evidently
strong
preference for the BC form over the FPC
form, as illustrated by Figure 6. As the
figure shows, none of the converting /
amending firms appears to have opted for a
FPC approach. This is a bit surprising,

charter in accordance with the statute, or
when through the formal conversion
process.
It is important to note, however, that the
new incorporations number may be biased
upwards, as it plausibly captures existing
firms that – while
newly created –
actually succeeded
to the business of
preexisting firms
through the asset
sale or acquisition
process.
That
said, as Figure 5
demonstrates, the
amending and/or
converting firms
tended to vary
considerably
in
age, ranging from 2
months to 37
years,
with
a
relatively uniform
distribution
in
9

opportunities” (or other typical forms of
commonly articulated purpose) are
significantly less concrete, and they are
thereby prone to more indeterminacies.
Although reference to established thirdparty standards might plausibly offer some
discipline in the assessment process, that
discipline is only as good as such standards
are reliable – a factor that is still unknown.
A second potential obstacle concerns
the nature of the financial returns (and thus
investment
potential)
from
social
entrepreneurship enterprises.
On first
glance,
a
business
organization’s
simultaneous pursuit of a social goal
alongside profit necessarily implies that the
firm will (and indeed must) make marginal
tradeoffs between profits and something else.
It naturally follows that such a firm’s
earnings would likely fall short of its forprofit peers, resulting in a market discount.
While the various reputational attractions
that social enterprises promise (among
employees, customers, creditors, and
suppliers of capital) might go some
distance to counteract that discount, it
seems wildly optimistic to expect such
factors to reverse it completely.
That said, it is important to remember
that capitalization discounts are not
concomitant with investment returns. In
fact, once a market discount (whatever its
size) is fully incorporated into company
valuation, it need not follow that the riskadjusted returns on that investment will lag
behind similarly situated for-profits. This is
a significant consideration for social
enterprises attempting to attract capital
from institutional investors, which
themselves are under an assortment of legal
duties to maximize risk-constrained yields
for their beneficiaries.
Moreover, although it is often
overlooked, it is important to keep in mind

given the impression that the FPC is widely
perceived to be a relatively modest
departure from a traditional corporate form
than is the BC. Although this evident
regularity may be due to the possibility that
new firms are more likely than established
ones to want to attract investments from
outsiders, or greater marketing visibility of
BC proponents,17 at this stage the drivers
behind this trend are unclear, and – as with
all these data – the trend itself may well
change or even reverse over time.

So, What Now?
Thus far, California’s and other states’
legislative experiments in social enterprise
business forms remain decidedly a work in
progress. While there is obviously interest
in these new corporate forms, judging by
California’s experience, uptake rates have
thus far been modest. In many respects,
this observation should not be too
surprising, given the novelty of the area,
the absence of developed case law, the lack
of
developed
best
practices
in
administering these sorts of business
entities, and the understandable aversion
that many have to being the first canary to
fly into a new statutory cave.
Fully
appreciating the implications of this new
“wave” in corporate organization, as well as
course adjustments that may be necessary,
will obviously require more time to let the
experiment percolate.
As the experiment plays out, a number
of unresolved issues are likely to receive
considerable attention. The first is one of
measuring and assessing individual firms’
performance in fulfilling their articulated
social purposes.
Unlike the standard
measures for profitability (EPS, ROA, etc.),
the markers of success in “enhancing
sustainability” or “improving educational
10

real-world data, across states, over time,
and along numerous dimensions. Thus far,
there is little concentrated effort to collect,
organize, and warehouse such data across
(or even within) states. Because such
information itself has significant public
benefits, moreover, it would seem
imprudent to leave its collection and
analysis to private entities (with private
motives) or partisan advocates (with
ideological commitments).
Respected
academic institutions or non-partisan
research centers are far more likely to be
reliable and credible source for data, best
practices, and policy relevant research on
corporate form, social purpose, and
entrepreneurship. The task of installing that
infrastructure is something that we can
(and should) work to accomplish today.

Creates New Officer or
Director Oversight Position?

Third-Party Accountability
Standards Required?

Enforcement Through Special
Actions or Proceedings?

General Social Purpose
Required?

Special Social Purpose
Required?

Stock Certificate Notification
Requirement?

California BC

Min. Status or 2/3 Vote
(Default) Requirement to
Change Purpose?

No
No
Hawaii BC
Unclear
Illinois BC
No
Louisiana BC
No
Maryland BC
No
New Jersey BC
Unclear
New York BC
No
South Carolina BC
No
Vermont BC
No
Virginia BC
No
Washington FPC
No
California FPC

Dissenting Shareholder Rights
Protection?

Non-Shareholder Stakeholder
Standing to Enforce?

that FPCs and BCs retain a real option to
convert into for-profits (upon a 2/3
shareholder vote), should the prevailing
market
environment
become
too
unwelcoming. This conversion option can
build in a type of internal safety net for
firm’s capital claimants, a factor that would
be reflected in lower downside equity
Betas, smaller credit spreads, and reduced
values-at-risk than for similarly situated forprofit organizations. Consequently, it is at
least plausible that social entrepreneurship
organizations would be more (not less)
appealing investment targets on systematic
risk grounds.
Of course, much of this discussion (at
least at present) is little more than idle
speculation. Testing, verifying, and/or
falsifying these conjectures will demand
more systematic access to (and analysis of)

Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes

Table 1: Major attributes of Enacted FPC/Benefit Corporation Statutes
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Endnotes
These include California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Vermont, Virginia and Washington.
2 See 2000 Census Bureau, County Business Patterns survey.
3 As explained below, California’s unique long arm statute makes it particularly attractive for private
corporations to incorporate in California, enhancing this home state bias.
4 AB 361, codified in California Corp. Code §§ 14600‐14631 (Benefit Corporations) and SB 201, codified in Cal.
Corp. Code §§ 2500‐3508. The competing bills were introduced and passed on parallel tracks, and both were
signed into law by California Governor Brown in October 2011, with simultaneous effective dates of January 1,
2012.
5 See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 101‐102.
6 Cal. Corp. Code § 202, which prescribes specific language for a general corporate purpose, and specifically
prohibits expansions of that purpose.
7 Although thirty states currently have such statutes, they are absent from both the California and Delaware
corporate codes. For a state‐by‐state accounting, see Jonathan Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes:
Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 Ann. Surv. Am. Law 85 (1999).
8 Cal. Corp. Code § 2115. The Delaware Supreme Court declared Section 2115 to be unconstitutional on
commerce clause grounds in VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).
Since the VantagePont holding, no California court has recognized it as binding on California courts, though
some recent decisions have acknowledged it in passing. E.g., Lidow v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2012).
9 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). Although California courts
are sometimes said to have “rejected” the Revlon doctrine, the evidence for this claim is questionable. Indeed,
there appears to be no published opinion by a California state court at any level that rejects the doctrine, and
the handful that cite Revlon appear to do so approvingly.
10 Compare Cal. Corp. Code § 2602(b) to § 14610(b). BCs may also adopt specific social purposes in addition to
a broad one. Id.
11 Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b).
12 For example, many other states (but not California) include requirements for director seats or officer titles
dedicated to the pursuit of the public benefit.
13 See, e.g., Susan Mac Cormac and Heather Haney, New Corporate Forms: One Viable Solution to Advancing
Environmental Sustainability, 24 J. App. Corp. Fin. 49‐58 (2012).
14 It bears noting, however, that FPC‐like statutes have also recently been proposed in a number of states.
15 Many thanks to the California Corporations Commissioner’s office for assistance in collecting this data.
16 Many of the 19 BCs incorporated in January, for example, appear to have been executed by a small number of
attorneys, which may be a byproduct of concerted marketing efforts by BC proponents. (This is but one of many
possibilities, however, and the data does not currently permit testing of it).
17 See note 16, supra.
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